On the path to differentiation:Upward transfer, logic of variation and sub-optimality in EU social policy by Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg & Uygur, Ayca
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
On the path to differentiation
Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Uygur, Ayca
Published in:
Journal of European Public Policy
DOI:
10.1080/13501763.2014.923020
Publication date:
2014
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Martinsen, D. S., & Uygur, A. (2014). On the path to differentiation: Upward transfer, logic of variation and sub-
optimality in EU social policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(9), 1255-1272.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.923020
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
 1 
On the path to differentiation: upward transfer, logic of variation and sub-
optimality in EU social policy 
 
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Ayca Uygur Wessel 
Journal of European Public Policy (2014) 21:9, pp. 1255-1272 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2014.923020?queryID=%24%7BresultBean.q
ueryID%7D#.U_H2_LccS70  
 
Abstract 
Studies of the upward transfer of power to European Union (EU) institutions have 
long focused on how integration is progressed. However, the burgeoning literature on 
differentiation has brought flexibility and variation into the picture. This paper aims to 
add to this strand of literature by examining the ‘path to differentiation’ within EU 
working time regulation as it has unfolded over time. It identifies the ‘opt-out’ as a 
means of differentiation adopted to overcome policy deadlocks within collective 
decision-making, albeit one with unforeseen consequences. In particular, the paper 
investigates the causes and effects of differentiation by examining 1) its origin, 2) the 
‘logic of variation’ or ‘opt-out spiral’ that spurs differentiation and 3) the implications 
of differentiation over time. The paper concludes that differentiation has dynamic and 
broad consequences that are likely to produce suboptimal policy outcomes and a 
decline in integration over time.  
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1. Introduction 
Upward transfer is one of the key concepts for understanding the dynamics of 
European integration (Jensen et al. 2014, this volume). However, upward transfer is 
often met with resistance, and more recent contributions to this literature particularly 
emphasise the importance of differentiation in European integration. Differentiated 
integration refers to cases in which ‘the territorial extension of European Union (EU) 
membership and EU rule validity are incongruent’ (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 
2012: 292), and it arises as a result of variation in the types and scopes of upward 
transfer in different member states and across policies. The conventional explanation 
is that greater heterogeneity among the member states and a broadened functional 
scope of EU regulation have caused differentiation to rise and to become increasingly 
visible across EU policies since the second half of the 1990s (Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig 2012: 299; Leuffen et al. 2013: 21).  
This paper examines the processes of upward transfer and differentiated integration in 
the EU’s working time regulation as it has unfolded over time. It identifies the ‘opt-
out’ as a means of differentiation that was adopted to overcome policy deadlocks 
within collective decision-making, albeit one with unforeseen consequences. In 
particular, the paper investigates the causes and effects of differentiation by 
examining 1) its origin, 2) the ‘logic of variation’ or ‘opt-out spiral’ that spurs 
differentiation and 3) its implications for integration over time. The paper thus 
engages in the processes and effects of variation in secondary legislation, as called for 
by the burgeoning literature on differentiated integration (Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig 2012; Leuffen et al. 2013). EU working time constitutes a key part of 
‘Social Europe’, where exemptions, special rules and opt-outs have existed for many 
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years. The logic of variation identified in EU social policy provides an example of 
how providing an exception to the general rule to overcome a specific joint decision 
trap has unforeseen yet major implications for forthcoming decision-making as well 
as for implementation and compliance in this regulatory field.  
The opt-out constitutes our operationalisation of differentiated integration because, 
when it is activated, the opt-out mechanism creates a de facto incongruence between 
the spatial extent of the EU and its jurisdiction. In a process of upward transfer, the 
opt-out serves two purposes. On the one hand, it serves a collective purpose, 
constituting a mechanism by which a joint decision trap may be overcome because a 
potential veto actor may agree on a common position if granted an exception from the 
general rule (Scharpf 2006: 857–858). On the other hand, the opt-out serves domestic 
purposes, serving as a mechanism for the member states to protect their national 
sovereignties.
1
  
The regulation of working time is a policy field of high political salience, as are most 
other parts of EU social policy. The Working Time Directive (WTD) was first 
adopted in 1993
2
 and aims to improve worker health and safety by setting minimum 
standards for organising working time. The EU regulation within the field is thus one 
of market correction and one that constitutes an important part of social Europe. In 
short, the Directive corrects the market by establishing a maximum of a 48-hour work 
week on average within a reference period of four months, with minimum daily and 
weekly rest periods and a minimum of 4 weeks of paid leave per year.  
                                                 
1
 The work of Adler-Nissen provides more general insights on the opt-out as an instrument to protect 
and manage the quest for national sovereignty; see Adler-Nissen (2008, 2011).  
 
2
 The Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerns certain aspects of the organisation 
of working time. 
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The process of upward transfer has created strong positions for the EU’s 
institutions—i.e., the European Commission (EC), the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), the European Parliament (EP), member states and their 
social partners. The EU’s regulation of working time thus involves multiple actors 
and institutions with distinct positions and preferences who are all seeking to control 
the process of upward transfer (Jensen et al. 2014). Upward transfer therefore 
constitutes an interesting case for examining the tensions and dynamics that unfold 
when EU competences are extended 1) between EU institutions and member states’ 
positions; 2) between the EU triangle of the Commission, Court and Parliament; and 
3) between the EU’s social partners.   
We consider the historical institutionalist framework for examining the theoretical 
process of upward transfer and contestation over time, but we find that it is inadequate 
for explaining nonlinear integration processes in which the logic of increasing returns 
does not apply. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 below presents the 
theoretical framework, data and method. Section 3 conducts the analysis of EU 
working time regulation over time and identifies the causes, dynamics and effects of 
differentiation on the secondary legislation of EU social policy. Section 4 provides 
concluding remarks on the identified ‘path to differentiation’.  
 
2. On Upward Transfer and Differentiated Integration 
‘Differentiated integration’ defines a situation in which some rules apply to a subset 
of member states alone, whereas other rules may also apply to non-members 
(Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012: 292). Thus, it characterises a Union that, 
through processes of upward transfer, has developed a core but at the same time 
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whose levels of centralisation and territorial extension vary by function (Leuffen et al. 
2013: 10). Based on the burgeoning literature on differentiated integration, the causes 
and effects of this variation have only been vaguely examined on theoretical terms, 
and empiricists tend to have concentrated on a small number of significant cases of 
primary law (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012: 293; Leuffen et al. 2013).
3
 This 
paper seeks to address this gap and explores how differentiated integration may be 
reflected in EU secondary law.  
Integration theories have foremost presented upward transfer from member states to 
the European Union as a forward and linear move—albeit sometimes slow and 
cumbersome. The battles between the theories on EU cooperation have aimed to 
explain why and how integration has occurred. However, both the treaty reforms and 
the daily decision-making processes of the EU have increasingly come to produce the 
institutional side effect of differentiated integration, which integration theories 
generally seem ill-equipped to explain. Processes of upward transfer that could 
gradually lead to decreased integration have not caught the attention of integration 
theories.  
Historical institutionalism stands out as the suitable frame for scholars who focus on 
policy processes as they unfold over time and who attribute a vital role to institutions 
in these processes. Applied to the study of EU policy processes, this institutionalism 
identifies a ‘path to European integration’ (Pierson 1996). According to Pierson’s 
(1996: 144–148) seminal argument, the initial steps of European integration will bring 
about more integration because it will be much costlier for the member states to 
extricate themselves from an arrangement than to invest in one. Resistant 
                                                 
3
 See also Stubb 1996; Egeberg and Trondal 1999 for some of the earlier work on differentiated 
integration.  
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supranational actors, unintended consequences of action and sunk costs all contribute 
to the linear course of European integration (Pierson 1996: 131–148). What is of great 
importance here are contingency effects, which arise through the unforeseen yet 
strong impact of ‘earlier events’, and institutional inertia, whereby ‘positive feedback 
effects’ ensure the stickiness of the institutional structures that are already in place 
(Pierson 2000: 263). Hence, such mechanisms ensure that, after the initial steps of 
European institutions and polity building, European integration will develop its own 
logic of ‘increasing returns’, thereby evolving in a path-dependent fashion that would 
favour an ‘ever closer union’ (Pierson 2000: 263).    
However, in an EU that is integrated in a differentiated fashion, forces of integration 
and contestation are expected to work in a more complex way. Differentiated 
integration opens up the possibility that the feedback mechanisms that characterise the 
logic of increasing returns may not always have an integrative effect. Feedback 
mechanisms are likely to dominate the interaction between forces of integration and 
forces of contestation as well. This contestation occurs along both a horizontal axis, 
on which the EU’s own inter-institutional dynamics come to the fore, and a vertical 
one, as EU institutions, member states and other relevant political actors respond to 
policy developments that are jointly created. In this sense, EU institutions are not 
expected to act uniformly regarding a question of integration given that the EC, the 
CJEU and the EP work through very different mechanisms. Furthermore, their 
decisions relate to member states and other relevant actors in distinct ways, often 
involving unintended consequences and influencing their positions.  
For the regulation of contested issue areas, such as social policy, we thus question 
why contingency effects and institutional inertia should guarantee a logic of 
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increasing returns that will necessarily push for further integration. We hypothesise 
that differentiation created at the initial stages of reform might develop a logic of 
variation instead of one of increasing returns. We further hypothesise that, when such 
a logic of variation is at work, the policy process might result not only in further 
differentiation through mechanisms of emulation but also in ‘sub-optimality’ in the 
sense that policy outcome no longer serves the purpose for which it was originally 
implemented. In the seminal work of Scharpf, the ‘joint-decision trap of EU collective 
decision making tends to generate sub-optimal policy outcomes’ (Scharpf 1988). Sub-
optimality occurs and extends when the development of a policy instrument diverges 
from its general aim and principles, allowing for heterogeneous application and 
lowering the common denominator of a regulatory text.   
Following our operationalisation of differentiation as the opt-out, we conceptualise 
the logic of variation as an opt-out spiral whereby the opt-out mechanism loses its 
integrative function of ‘getting the awkward partner on board’ but is emulated by 
other parties as a way of counteracting integrative forces, ultimately resulting in even 
further differentiated and possibly suboptimal policy outcomes, as explored below.  
 
Opt-outs; differentiation in concrete terms 
Opt-outs and other forms of exceptions that are conducive to member-state flexibility 
are generally accepted as some of the most effective consensus-promoting 
mechanisms in the European integration literature (Falkner 2011: 12; Trauner 2011). 
In EU politics, a wide range of flexibility is at the disposal of the decision-makers to 
establish compromises. These instruments of flexibility may all generate a logic of 
variation in EU integration. Member states may be granted temporal or permanent 
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opt-outs. Sectorial exemptions may be adopted into a regulatory text. Derogations 
from the general rule may be inserted as articles and so forth. By providing a larger 
and more flexible space in which the member state governments can manoeuvre, 
exceptions can indeed provide a way out of a joint decision trap. The opt-out is one 
such exception that a member state may request and other member states may be 
willing to grant to overcome a policy deadlock, even as they accept differentiation 
(Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012: 299). Especially concerning issue areas in 
which political salience is relatively high and when very divergent national points of 
view characterise the negotiations, legislation with the possibility of opting out might 
be considered to be more beneficial compared with no legislation at all for the 
majority of stake holders. The importance of opt-outs is well known within treaty law 
(Adler-Nissen 2008, 2011; Dyson and Marcussen 2010; Trauner 2011). However, 
opt-outs have also been used successfully in secondary law—for example, in the area 
of environmental policy, in which negotiators have avoided the risk of veto by 
providing particular exceptions or the possibility of derogations (Holzinger 2011: 
122–123). The findings in the analysis below are thus not likely to be particular to the 
social policy area but to have a wider reach with regard to the causes, dynamics and 
effects of decision making when exceptions are permitted. Such exceptions are likely 
to give way to a ‘multi-speed Europe’ where countries can choose to be integrated 
into the European unit as much as their ‘political sensitivities’ permit them (Scharpf 
2006: 857–858). We thus claim that the theoretical and empirical findings of the 
analysis conducted below have certain generalisability for other policy areas in which 
exemptions or opt-outs are granted to stimulate the integration process.  
Whereas opt-outs are considered to be beneficial for EU legislation to move forward 
in areas where no other alternatives exist, the current literature has not fully 
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considered the potential backsliding that opt-outs may produce. Although the current 
literature on differentiated integration calls attention to the possible second-order 
problems created by policy exemptions (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012: 299), 
these problems have yet to be systematically analysed. Opt-outs can be a desired 
mechanism in cases when they enable the majority of the actors to escape 
compromises at the lowest common denominator by providing certain exceptions to 
the others. A multi-speed Europe allows those who favour European solutions to go 
forward and those who prefer the national status quo to stay behind. However, the use 
of opt-outs by several member states in a particular area can also lead to sub-
optimalities with regard to the outcome of European-level decision-making. Hence, 
one of the potential unintended consequences of providing opt-outs in politically 
sensitive areas is that increased differentiation challenges the fundamental idea of 
European integration, de facto leading to the decline of integration. The adoption of 
opt-outs, exemptions and other special rules to retain the compliance of one member 
state may develop its own expansive logic, creating an opt-out spiral wherein other 
member states claim similar arrangements. The opt-out thus gradually expands from a 
specific arrangement to common practice and from being a special rule to a more 
general feature of community legislation.
4
 In that case, the balance tips. The opt-out 
then transforms from being something that overcomes a policy deadlock into a 
counterproductive feature of collective decisions. 
In this sense, instead of an onward move toward further integration, a specific output 
at T0 may initiate a logic of variation with unintended consequences and lock-in 
effects created by the opt-out mechanism. Allowing one actor a special rule of 
regulation to overcome a policy deadlock introduces new policy options for the other 
                                                 
4
 On the gradual expansion of ‘special rules’, see Martinsen and Falkner 2011.  
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member states to consider at T1 as well. As a result, an unintended process of 
emulation may be set into motion, with dynamic regulatory effects for the outcome of 
the policy process. In this scenario, the output at T2 has a causal link back to the 
collective decision at T0, when concessions were made to bring the difficult member 
state on board, but the regulatory output at T2 is one of increased variation instead of 
greater uniformity.  
The analytical findings below identify a causal logic that leads to further 
differentiation. The causal dynamic runs as follows: an opt-out is initially granted 
because of the consensus norm in Council decision-making and the attempt to bring 
everyone ‘on board’. The opt-out granted to the UK in isolation serves as a point of 
emulation for the other member states. The case law of the Court furthermore urges 
other member states to request the opt-out. This creates an opt-out spiral. A logic of 
variation with broad implications for the state of a social Union results.    
 
Data and Methods  
In our study, we use the method of process tracing to provide a single case analysis of 
EU regulation of working time between 1987 and 2012 and to establish causality in a 
process of differentiation (George and Bennett 2005: 205 ff.; Beach and Pedersen 
2013). As one of the most suitable methods for conducting within-case analyses, 
process tracing takes a straightforward causal relationship from the initial theory, 
deconstructs this relationship into sequences and examines each divergent step to 
demonstrate how the causal sequence unfolds over time (Hancké 2009: 66–68). In our 
study, these divergent steps are identified as T0, T1 and T2. The empirical data for this 
study were collected as part of a larger comparative research project examining 
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current inter-institutional dynamics in EU social policy. It consists of two main data 
sources: 1) documents on the EU legislative process were collected and analysed, 
ranging from original Commission proposals and key assessments, Council 
compromise texts, individual and common position papers, position papers of EP 
political groups, and EP compromise texts and committee reports to social partners’ 
positions and statements. The documents include a number of confidential position 
papers and letters that the interview respondents chose to allow us to use to give us 
broader insight into the processes behind the official arenas of decision-making; and 
2) A large number of qualitative interviews were conducted with key respondents, 
including Commission civil servants in the relevant units of the relevant General 
Directorates, Council experts (mainly from the national delegations who were acting 
as Council representatives in the Council working groups), and members of the EP (in 
particular, rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs as well as their assistants) and finally 
key negotiators from the social partners and some national representatives. The 
interviews were conducted between September 2011 and July 2013.  
 
3. Regulating Working Time 
A close empirical study of the processes that surround the EU regulation of working 
time reveals that the upward transfer of market correction is no simple power shift 
from the national to the supranational level. Instead, it is a battlefield between EU 
institutions that do not always act jointly—i.e., individual member states with diverse 
positions and disagreeing social partners. The integration process is marked by power 
dispersion such that many key actors and institutions aim to influence how regulation 
of working time unfolds over time.  
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As the analysis below demonstrates, such transfers of competencies can produce 
differentiation and cause the process to depart from a simple forward course of 
integration. Differentiation may have its own spurring logic, where integration is met 
by contestation, which furthers differentiation. EU working time regulation implies a 
logic of variation in which differentiation extends in a causal dynamic that unfolds 
over time across T0, T1 and T2. The isolated position of the UK, combined with the 
consensus norm of the Council, is the cause of differentiation at T0. Subsequent legal 
integration, met by political contestation in an enlarged EU, constitutes the causal 
dynamics at T1. The contestation of legal integration spurs differentiation in an opt-out 
spiral, producing suboptimal institutional output at T2. 
In this process, the CJEU acts as a key player who disturbs the established status quo 
with controversial legal decisions. The EP pushes for reforms that will codify the 
Court’s ruling. This is met with contestation. The European Commission acts much 
more reluctantly, siding with key players in the Council. The Council initially aims 
for consensus but is increasingly disturbed by the ‘awkward’ position of the UK. 
Finally, the social partners are called in to reform what the EU and national decision-
makers have been unable to do. Table 1 provides a simplified overview of actor 
positions with regard to upward transfer in the EU in the area of working time. 
Table 1: Actor Constellations in Upward Transfer 
Pro-Upward Transfer; Integration Resistant to Upward Transfer; Contestation 
EP 
EC (complex role. Proposes departure from 
the case-law of the Court) 
Social partners (employee) Social partners (Business Europe) 
Some Council members (France, Sweden, DK) Some Council members (UK+15) 
CJEU   
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T0—The Cause of Differentiation  
Upon the adoption of the Single European Act in 1987, health and safety at work was 
introduced for the first time in the EEC Treaty by means of article 118A, which set 
out that measures could be adopted through qualified majority voting. In 1990, the 
Commission proposed a Working Time Directive based on article 118A. The UK, 
however, firmly opposed the choice of legal basis, arguing that working time was not 
a health and safety matter but rather an employment issue for which reason the correct 
Treaty basis was either article 100 or article 235, both of which required unanimity 
(Lewis 2003: 116).  
The UK protest on the legal basis was not accepted. Negotiations continued. Despite 
this defeat, the UK participated in Council negotiations, and many attempts were 
made to bring the UK on board by offering important concessions. The UK pushed 
for exemptions for some sectors, implying that the sectors of air, rail, road, sea, inland 
waterway, lake transport, sea fishing, other work at sea and the activities of doctors in 
training were exempt from EU working time regulations. Moreover, the UK was 
granted an opt-out from the 48-hour work week, laying down that workers on an 
individual basis could agree with their employer that the 48-hour ceiling did not apply 
to them (article 18 (b) (i)). In that way, the UK influenced the general output of 
negotiations in significant ways, although owing to the rule of qualified majority 
voting, the other member states could have chosen to ignore the viewpoints of one 
member state. Even in 1991, a sufficient qualified majority existed, but the Council 
continued negotiations for another two years, attempting to establish consensus and 
bring ’everyone on board’ (Lewis 2003: 118).  
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The opt-out, exemptions and derogations inserted into the texts meant that, from the 
beginning, the working time rules became rather patchy. A compromise text was 
established that, from the beginning, the UK had influenced a great deal beyond what 
voting rules could account for. However, at this point, the opt-out was thought to be a 
delimited concession granted to bring the ‘awkward partner’ on board rather than a 
mechanism with its own dynamics. Working time was defined as ‘any period during 
which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity 
or duties’ and rest periods as ‘any period which is not working time’ (Art. 2 (1) and 
(2) of Directive 93/104/EC).  
To the surprise of the other actors in the Council, the UK decided to abstain from the 
final vote (Beach 2001: 156). The abstention became one of a number of 
manifestations of the British member state against EU working time regulations. The 
point of departure for further differentiation had been created. 
 
T1—Integration, contestation and the opt-out spiral   
Soon after the adoption of the Directive, the UK brought an annulment procedure 
before the CJEU, maintaining that article 118A was an inappropriate legal basis for 
the Directive. The CJEU did not, for the most part, support the UK’s position, and it 
concluded that article 118A was the appropriate legal basis.
5
 The initial battles on 
working time were over, and additional transfer could take place. In 2000, the 
                                                 
5
 C-84/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union 
(1996) ECR I-5755.  
 
 16 
Directive was revised to bring the previously exempted sectors, except for seafarers, 
into it.
6
  
Shortly after the revision, the new status quo of EU working time regulation was 
confronted with severe challenges by the European Court of Justice. The preliminary 
reference—‘SiMAP’—was sent to the European Court by the Spanish Trade Union of 
Doctors in Public Service and questioned whether on-call time for doctors was to 
count as working time.
7
 The CJEU established that doctors were not excluded from 
the Directive, although article 2 (2) of the framework directive allows for the 
exemption of public service activities that maintain public order and security. 
Furthermore, the Court set down that on-call time spent in a healthcare institution 
constituted working time within the meaning of the Directive, whereas on-call duty 
when the doctor did not have to be at the healthcare centre did not:  
Time spent on call by doctors in primary healthcare teams must be 
regarded in its entirety as working time, and where appropriate as 
overtime, within the meaning of Directive 93/104 if they are required 
to be at the health centre. If they must merely be contactable at all 
times when on call, only time linked to the actual provision of primary 
healthcare services must be regarded as working time (CJEU 
conclusion in case C-303/98 SIMAP).   
                                                 
6
 Directive 2000/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 2000, amending 
Council Directive 93/104/EC concerns certain aspects of the organisation of working time to cover 
sectors and activities excluded from that directive.  
 
7
 Case C-303/98 Sindicato de Medicos de Asistencia Publica (SiMAP) v Conselleria de Sanidad y 
Consumo de la Generalidad Valenciana. [2000] ECR 1-7963.  
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The SiMAP ruling caused great political upset. In a joint letter sent to the 
Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs from the British, Danish, Dutch 
and Swedish health ministers, the ministers emphasised their concern, writing: 
The impact of the judgement on (all) our health systems could be to 
significantly reduce the availability and productivity of doctors. This 
may lead in some cases to the reorganisation and reduction of services, 
as more doctors or other practitioners will be required to staff the 
service (unofficial letter from “Health Ministers to Commission on 
WTD/SIMAP”).  
The ruling went significantly beyond what the Council had agreed to include in the 
working time definition. It seems from the first responses that the SiMAP ruling was 
simply too controversial to address. Only a short number of weeks after the SiMAP 
decision, the Commission published a report that evaluated the implementation of the 
Working Time Directive. In this, the Commission only mentioned the SiMAP case 
briefly and did not much engage in the question of on-call time. The Commission’s 
reluctance to bring in the new working time definition shows that, at that point, it did 
not want to challenge the member states and did not want to use the CJEU decision to 
extend the scope of European regulation. It had, however, known for a long time that 
on-call time was more generally disputed, at least from the time when the case was 
referred to the CJEU in 1998. This suggests that the Commission deliberately chose to 
ignore the judgment and not set fire to the political battles on working time. In 
addition, the German Federal Minister of Labour, Walter Riester, refused any general 
impact of the judgment, officially stating that, because the ruling addressed the 
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Spanish system, it did not apply to Germany, even though the Spanish and German 
regulations were quite similar (Nowak 2008: 456).  
The subsequent case of CIG
8
, however, repeated the conclusions of SiMAP. In 2003, 
the Jaeger case followed
9
. The Jaeger case was the next piece of legal integration to 
produce severe disturbance in the course of regulation. In this case, a higher German 
labour court asked the CJEU if time inactively spent on-call counted as working time 
even if the doctor was able to sleep during that time. Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK all delivered opinions in the case, sharing the viewpoint that 
time spent inactively on-call was not working time. In the hearings before the Court, 
the German government presented a very alarming economic impact assessment, 
saying that, if the Court confirmed the case law in the SiMAP case, staffing 
requirements would increase by 24% and between 15,000 and 27,000 additional 
doctors would have to be employed; the Germans estimated that the additional costs 
would come to EUR 1.75 billion.
10
 The Commission, on the other hand, held the 
opinion that on-call time was always working time because the employee had to be at 
the disposal of the employer.
11
 The Commission’s opinion is interesting because it 
demonstrates that, at that point, it had accepted the CJEU’s definition of working time 
in SiMAP. It did not, however, maintain this position, as is demonstrated below.   
The CJEU’s conclusions were largely a restatement of the SiMAP ruling, determining 
that on-call time for which the doctor had to be physically present at the hospital, 
                                                 
8
 C-241/99 Confederación Intersindical Galega (CIG) v Servicio Galega de Saúde (Sergas) (2001) ECR 
I-5139.  
 
9
 Case C-151/02 Landeshauptstadt Kiel v Norbert Jaeger (2003) ECR 8389. 
 
10
 See COM (2003) 843: 20 for this assessment.  
 
11
 See the opinion of Mr Ruiz-Jarabo in Jäeger, para. 18.  
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regardless of whether he or she could rest, was working time within the meaning of 
the Directive. From the Jaeger ruling, it was irrevocably clear that the inclusion of on-
call time as working time applied generally, not specifically to the Spanish system as 
had previously been held by the German Minister of Labour. Despite the clear line of 
legal interpretation, many countries flouted the CJEU’s conclusions and did not 
implement them (Financial Times 2005). Through this form of national disobedience, 
ignoring the case law of the Court, member states demonstrated that the course of 
integration was indeed contested.             
In early 2004, the Commission followed up on the SiMAP and Jaeger rulings and sent 
out a communication as the initial step to revising the Working Time Directive. The 
Communication addressed the opt-out possibility in article 18 (1) (b) (i), which 
allowed for an individual agreement between employer and employee for the 
employee to work beyond the 48-hour work week. The Communication furthermore 
provided a dense impact analysis of the CJEU case law. The Commission recognised 
that the judgments of the Court had to be considered but did not establish the specific 
ways of how to do so. In the Communication, the Commission made clear that the 
Court decisions had extended the use of the opt-out. Before the SiMAP ruling, only 
the UK had made use of the opt-out. As a consequence of the SiMAP ruling, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Spain adopted the opt-out for the hospital sector. 
Luxembourg introduced the opt-out arrangement for hotels and catering. Furthermore, 
the Commission noted that, among the new member states, Malta, Cyprus and 
Slovenia had already adopted the opt-out possibility into their national legislation, and 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania were expected to follow suit (COM 2003: 15–
16). The case law of the Court had thus caused an expansion of the opt-out from one 
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member state to 13, creating a considerable degree of differentiation in the application 
of the rules. An opt-out spiral had been created.   
The European Parliament promptly reacted to the Commission’s communication by 
means of a resolution. In the resolution, the EP criticised the Commission for being 
inconclusive as to how to move forward. The EP also called for the abolition of the 
individual opt-out possibility. It noted that the use of the opt-out had grown 
considerably within the UK and had spread to other member states. The EP 
emphasised that other member states had taken on the opt-out possibility to overcome 
the problems raised by the SiMAP and Jaeger decisions: ‘It can therefore be said that 
use of the opt-out has been general rather than specific, under subjective rather than 
objective conditions and to an extent that exceeds practical requirements’ (A5-
0026/2004: 13).   
 
T2—Differentiation and sub-optimality   
As a first attempt to revise the WTD, the Commission asked the social partners to 
enter negotiations and work out an agreement. However, the social partners declined 
to do so (COM 2004: 2), apparently because of the refusal of the European employer 
organisation UNICE (interview, social partners, August 2012). It was therefore up to 
the Commission to initiate a legislative process for revising the Working Time 
Directive. In September 2004, the Commission introduced its official proposal for 
amending the Working Time Directive.
12
 The Commission proposal marked a 
departure from the course of legal integration, and the case law of the Court was 
                                                 
12
 COM (2004).  
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referenced only once. In fact, the Commission’s proposal introduced a fundamental 
breach with established case law by distinguishing between ‘on-call time’ and 
‘inactive on-call time’. The new category ‘inactive on-call time’ was established as 
follows:  
The inactive part of on-call time shall not be regarded as working 
time, unless national law or, in accordance with national law and/or 
practice, a collective agreement or an agreement between the two sides 
of industry decides otherwise. The period during which the worker 
carries out his activity or duties during on-call time shall always be 
regarded as working time (art. 2a of COM 2004, emphasis added).    
In addition, the proposal maintained the opt-out possibility regarding the 48-hour 
work week but introduced the requirement that the opt-out had to be agreed upon in a 
collective agreement between social partners and not based on individual consent 
alone (COM 2004: 4, para. 12). However, when there was no collective agreement in 
place, individual consent would suffice. Furthermore, the Commission proposed 
extending the reference period for calculating the maximum weekly working time 
from four months to one year (COM 2004: 4, para. 14). In sum, the Commission’s 
proposal departed from established case law and furthermore gave companies and 
member states greater flexibility in the organisation of working time. As such, the 
2004 proposal represented a setback to the social rights that had evolved in the course 
of legal integration.     
The Council of Ministers welcomed the distinction between ‘in-active on-call time’ 
and ‘on-call time’, claiming that it would introduce legal certainty. The Council also 
welcomed the extension of the reference period (Nowak 2008: 463). However, the 
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member states disagreed on the questions of opt-out. France and Sweden were the 
most vocal advocates for ending the opt-out possibility, whereas Poland backed the 
UK on maintaining the right to exemption (Financial Times  2005).  
The EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs was responsible for the 
political examination of the proposal, and the position of rapporteur was held by the 
Spanish minister of the EP (MEP) from the S & D group, Alejandro Cercas.
13
 The EP 
accepted all of the amendments as put forward by the rapporteur and thus established 
a strong cross-party consensus. From the first reading, the EP took a firm stand 
against the Commission’s proposal and for other reasons, finding that it represented 
an unacceptable overturn of the Court’s case law (EP Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs 2005: 19). Furthermore, the EP strongly opposed keeping the opt-out 
possibility as well as extending the reference period. It found that the Commission 
had disregarded the EP’s early opinion and that the entire proposal went in the 
opposite direction of what the EP had previously clearly stated as its preferences (EP 
report A6-0105/2005: 16–17). 
Five years of negotiations followed within and between the two legislatures. 
Throughout negotiations, the EP stood firm on its call to eliminate the opt-out 
(Financial Times 2008). By the end of April 2009, the EP had definitively vetoed the 
Council compromise (Conciliation committee decision 2009). For the first time, the 
third reading conciliation procedure between the EP and the Council did not manage 
to establish agreement (interview, social partners, August 2012). 
Essentially, the opt-out made an inter-institutional compromise between the EP and 
the Council impossible. The parliament’s viewpoint was that the opt-out was a 
                                                 
13
 See report on the proposal from the EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (2005). 
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temporary phenomenon, included as a temporary concession to one member state at a 
difficult time. According to the parliament, it was never intended to continue 
(interview, Commission 3 March 2012; interview EP, 29 March 2012). The Council, 
however, was internally divided on the issue. Some member states were willing to end 
it, and others to phase it out. However, for an increasing number of the Council’s 
members, it had become a fundamental issue ‘that they never intended would be other 
than permanent’ (interview, Commission, 3 March 2012). This Council alliance 
insisting on the opt-out had been further strengthened by enlargement. A considerable 
number of the new member states, including Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and Bulgaria, 
took the same approach as the UK and adopted an opt-out that applied across all 
sectors. Other new member states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia—had demanded an opt-out of more limited use that would be 
restricted to specific sectors, especially healthcare. In addition, Germany, Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain had opt-outs for some of their sectors (COM 
2010a; COM 2010b: 84–99). Thus, from being a concession granted to one member 
state, the opt-out had developed into a rule that applied to a majority of the member 
states. This majority observed no reason to compromise on the opt-out, which allowed 
them to avoid what they considered to be the negative consequences of the Court’s 
case law. The opt-out became the reason the EP and the Council were not able to 
reach a compromise in the conciliation committee. Differentiation had gradually 
expanded into shielding the majority of member states from the main principle of EU 
working time regulations.  
The long-lasting political negotiations had failed, and despite five years of dialogue, 
bargains and concessions, no solution was found and no reform of the Directive was 
adopted. A solution to the on-call problem was, however, still strongly demanded 
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(Financial Times 2009). In March 2010, the Commission restarted the process of 
revising the Working Time Directive by consulting the European social partners.  
Eighteen months later, in November 2011, the European social partners declared that, 
this time, they were willing to negotiate in accordance with the social consultation 
procedure provided for in Articles 154 and 155 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). Business Europe
14
 had changed its position and now 
accepted the Commission’s invitation, in part because a clarification to the case law 
was broadly requested but also because both sides of the social partners had an 
interest in revitalising the ‘corporatist policy community’ from the 1990s that had 
successfully concluded European collective agreements on labour law issues
15
 
(interview, social partners, August 2012; Falkner 1998; Martinsen and Falkner 2011: 
131–133). The social partners initiated their negotiations in late 2011. The first 
meeting was held on 8 December 2011. The first half-year primarily addressed 
agreeing on what was open to negotiation (interviews, social partners, March 2012, 
November 2012). The Commission agreed to extend the initial first 9 months that had 
been granted for negotiations to 31 December 2012, ‘given that their negotiations are 
making progress’ (Commission press release 2012). However, the timeframe was 
tight and disagreements paramount. ETUC
16
 conducted the negotiations on behalf of 
the European employees, and the employer side was represented by Business Europe, 
with CEEP
17
 representing the public-sector employers and UEAPME
18
 representing 
                                                 
14
 In 2007, the European Employers’ organisation UNICE changed its name to Business Europe.   
 
15
 In the 1990s, three legally binding collective agreements were concluded that were implemented in 
directives: parental leave in December 1995, part-time work in June 1997 and fixed-term work in 
March 1999 (Martinsen and Falkner 2011: 133). 
   
16
 The European Trade Union Confederation 
 
17
 European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public services. 
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the employers from small and medium-sized enterprises. Although the employers 
formally agreed to also bring the opt-out into negotiations, in reality this was not an 
option because an agreement still had to be incorporated into a Council Directive, and 
the partners knew that the UK would do its utmost to block such a result (interview, 
social partners, June 2013). Although ETUC and CEEP largely concurred on the need 
to establish an agreement, Business Europe blocked progress in negotiations. The 
main disagreements were about the definition of working time and the opt-out 
(interviews, social partners, June 2013, July 2013). After an executive committee 
meeting on 5–6 December 2012, ETUC made it clear that it did not wish to continue 
negotiations. The social dialogue on working time had failed, and the latest attempt to 
revise the suboptimal text on EU working time could not overcome the policy 
deadlock and reduce differentiation.   
 
Implications of differentiation in EU working time regulations 
Whereas differentiation at T0 had allowed integration to proceed for the large majority 
of member states, it gradually expanded sub-optimality to the extent that an increasing 
number of member states departed from the general rule. Examined over time, the 
effects of the opt-out extended much beyond the isolated incident at T0, when the UK 
won its concessions and the consensus norm of Council negotiations was maintained. 
Over time, such differentiation produced a logic of variation, where the opt-out 
possibility was generalised from the one to the many to avoid the impact of the 
Court’s case law. The exception had become the general rule: 
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 The European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. 
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And the problems with the opt-out is that of course the ruling has 
created a situation where countries to be able to cope had to introduce 
the opt-out, although they hadn’t introduced the opt-out before, like 
Germany for instance, or many other countries. (…) The opt-out was 
not a subject matter for the case law because the ruling was only about 
on-call, but it was the increasing recourse to the introduction to the 
opt-out was the direct consequence of the ruling of the on-call time 
(interview, social partners, July 2013). 
Legal integration was met with contestation and came to extend differentiation. The 
suboptimal regulatory system that was generated had severe consequences for 
implementation and compliance within the field of working time regulation, such that 
no member states will likely comply with the Directive as it has developed in light of 
the Court’s interpretations (interviews, social partners, November 2012; January 
2013; June 2013; July 2013). It is also expected that more member states will request 
the opt-out in the future to avoid the case law (interview, social partners, January 
2013). This implies that EU working time regulations resemble ‘an emmentaler where 
the holes are bigger than the cheese’ (interview, social partners, March 2012). The 
economic and social effects of increased differentiation are held to be significant 
because they bring competitive advantages, even as they damage the health and safety 
of workers, to those member states where workers can work beyond the 48-hours 
work rule (interviews, social partners, January 2013, June 2013). Thus, differentiation 
has effects on those member states that opt for more peripheral integration, but it also 
has consequences for those that remain in the core as it becomes increasingly 
impossible to revise the directive and ensure its compliance. The logic of variation 
that was created has broad implications. Exceptions have become the general rule, 
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with important consequences for implementation, compliance and legitimacy for both 
the core member states and the periphery.    
 
4. Conclusion 
EU integration is increasingly being characterised by differentiation. In a European 
Union of heterogeneity and ample functional scope, both the core member states, who 
want to move forward, and the periphery, who wish to stay behind, are calling for 
more flexibility in supranational legislation. However, as this paper has demonstrated, 
allowing for differentiation to overcome a joint decision trap has dynamic and broad 
implications that are likely to produce a decline of integration over time. When one 
member state has embarked on the path to differentiation, it offers similar 
opportunities to fellow member states. CJEU litigation does not necessarily strengthen 
integration, but it may amplify the logic of variation as in the present case, in which 
more member states request the opt-out to shield themselves from the impact of the 
Court. Whereas the opt-out is a short-term solution for the EU member states in 
managing upward transfer, its effects are far-reaching, leading to the decline of 
integration and sub-optimal policy outcomes.   
In the recent literature on European integration, a multi-speed Europe is introduced as 
a possible way to avoid not only deadlocks in decision-making but also potentially the 
democratic deficit of the EU. The argument holds that the possibility of granting 
member state exceptions on politically sensitive matters would provide the EU with 
both a better functioning and a more legitimate legislative process (Scharpf 2006: 
856–861). However, our analysis shows that the introduction of the opt-out might in 
fact have had the very opposite effect of that intended. As the case of working time 
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regulation reveals, the introduction of opt-outs can inspire numerous member states to 
demand and introduce this option in a variety of ways. As a result of the spiralling of 
opt-outs and the uneven implementation record across member states, the outcome of 
regulation becomes increasingly suboptimal. When a European rule only applies to 
some in full and to others in parts, heterogeneity increases. Differentiation affects 
those member states that place themselves on the periphery. They gain a competitive 
advantage over member states that apply the regulation in full. At the same time, opt-
outs have social consequences, as in the present case in which EU social rights differ 
across member states. Differentiation also affects the remaining member states in the 
core because additional integration becomes increasingly difficult when those on the 
periphery insist on maintaining their exceptions. Because exceptions are difficult to 
reverse, they generate sunk costs and lock-in effects as well.  
Uneven rules create uneven implementation. Implementation comes to differ 
considerably across member states, ultimately affecting compliance. Over time, 
differentiation is no longer an isolated solution to bringing the ‘difficult’ on board but 
becomes a cause with dynamic effects. It serves as a point of emulation for other 
member states, thus creating a logic of variation with lock-in effects for the further 
path to differentiation. Integration theories are generally ill-equipped to explain these 
discrepancies, for decades focusing on when and why integration takes place and 
overlooking the cases in which it does not. However, in a union of increased 
heterogeneity and contested upward transfer, responsive integration theories are 
called for that will be equally capable of explaining the logic of variation as well as 
the forward moves.   
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